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SECOND PRIZE WINNER OF
THE ANDREW P. VANCE MEMO-
RIAL WRITING COMPETITION
ADDRESSING THE GREY MARKET-WHAT
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE
DONE
Jay P. Moisant*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States recently decided
a case' which resolves the scope of the Copyright Act of 19762
(Copyright Act). The result of this decision affected an area of
international trade known as grey market or parallel import-
ing. Due to the Supreme Court decision, grey market imports
are no longer prohibited in the United States.
Coincidentally, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities also recently decided a similar case which resulted in
the opposite result In the European Community, grey market
imports are prohibited. If two such distinguished Courts can
come to diametrically opposed decisions regarding the issue of
grey market imports, one wonders if the reasoning involved in
at least one of the Courts is sound.
This Note will first define the grey market import and
situations in which parallel importing can occur. Next, this
Note will examine trademark and copyright laws and their
* Oklahoma City University Law School, graduating in year 2000.
1. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998).
2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
3. See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Harlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 [hereinafter
Silhouette Int'l].
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applicability to a grey market importer. This examination
includes a brief look at relevant case law which will be fol-
lowed by a closer look at the Copyright Act of 1976. The Su-
preme Court decision which resolves the applicability of U.S.
law to grey market imports will then be discussed. This deci-
sion will be followed by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities' decision regarding a similar issue. This Note will
then attempt to find a realistic compromise between the two
decisions by essentially narrowing the European Court of
Justice's holding and broadening the Supreme Court's. Finally,
methods will be examined in which U.S. firms can circumvent
the unfortunate effects of the Supreme Court decision.
I. PARALLEL IMPORTING DEFINED
Consider the following example:
Widgette, Inc. is in the business of manufacturing and
selling widgets both in domestic and international markets.
Widgette sells its product in the United States for $10. It also
sells its product in France, but because of the differences in
currency exchange rates and increased competition, the price of
the widget is only $5 in French markets.
The Great Parisian Trading Company decides to purchase
a large shipment of widgets at the French price of $5 a widget.
After some prospecting for a distributor, The Great Parisian
Trading Company finds Hellman's Bargain-marts, Inc. to sell
the widget in the United States. The shipment of widgets is
sold to Hellman's at $7 a widget. Hellman's turns around and
sells the widget in the United States for $8 a widget. In doing
so, Widgette, Inc., the manufacturer of the widget, finds itself
in the unusual circumstance of having to compete with its own
product in the United States market. The widgets being re-
imported are grey market or parallel imports.
The scenario described above is one example of how grey
market imports can occur. The main reason parallel importa-
tion occurs is "because of price differences in the global mar-
ketplace.' For example, a business may attempt to enter a
very competitive foreign market. As a marketing strategy, that
business introduces its product in the foreign market at a
4. Lawrence M. Friedman, Business and Legal Strategies for Combating Grey.
Market Imports, 32 INTL LAW. 27, 28 (1998).
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substantial discount compared to its sales price for the product
in the domestic market. Depending on the size of the discount,
intermediaries may be able to purchase the product in the
foreign market and re-import it into the domestic market for
resale.
Sometimes a producer will attempt to create a consumer
perception of high quality or class in regards to its product.5
To assist in such a strategy, the producer will limit its distri-
bution to upscale retailers.6 Discount retailers sometimes find
the product available abroad at discounted prices and import it
for resale.' This undercuts the intentions of the producer.
With few exceptions, the manufacturer of the good seeks to
prohibit the unauthorized importation of the good. In the Unit-
ed States, there are a number of strategies that may be pur-
sued by the manufacturer of the good in order to prevent the
grey market good's importation.' The main body of law which
addresses this issue of grey market goods resides in copyright
and trademark law This Note is limited in its scope as it
only addresses those goods produced by companies that are
authorized to do so. The issue of counterfeit merchandise will
not be discussed.
II. THE APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAWS TO
THE GREY MARK T IMPORTER
A. Trademarks
This Note will examine first how U.S. trademark law can
help the manufacturer. Possessing a trademark for a good
gives its owner the expectation of being able to prohibit anoth-
er party from selling goods under the same trademark. A brief
look at the history of case law in this area will help shed light
upon whether trademark law will assist the trademark owner
in preventing grey market imports.
In 1923, the Supreme Court decided A. Bourjois & Compa-
ny, Inc. v. Katzel. The Court held that "[o]wnership of the
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 49-50.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
10. 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
19991
BROOK. J. INTL L.
goods does not carry the right to sell them with a specific
mark. It does not necessarily carry the right to sell them at all
in a given place."1 The end result of this case seems to be
that trademark holders have the right to prohibit an owner of
their goods from importing and selling them.12 Therefore, gen-
erally speaking, grey market goods are prohibited by U.S.
trademark law.
However, in 1924, the Supreme Court seemed to advocate
certain situations in which grey market goods are not prohibit-
ed by trademark law when it decided Prestonettes, Inc. v.
Coty." The rule taken from this case appears to be that an
importer of grey market goods could rely upon the trademark
to identify the good (and the source of the good), but could not
use the mark to deceive the consumer where he or she would
be led to believe that the trademark holder was the seller. 4
The justification for this ruling comes from the Court's
recognition that a U.S. trademark holder has an interest in
protecting the goodwill it has generated with the U.S. consum-
er. 5 If a grey market importer was allowed to apply the
trademark in a way that would lead the consumer to believe
the trademark holder and the seller were one and the same, it
would receive the benefit of the goodwill generated."1
The court further developed the idea of preventing confu-
sion to the consumer with grey market imports in the cases of
Lever Brothers Co. v. United States' and in Societe Des
Produits Nestle, S-A v. Casa Helvetia, Inc. 8 These cases re-
garded instances in which the grey market good was different
than the good offered domestically. The Lever case, for exam-
ple, involved a soap producer that had developed a soap de-
signed for British tastes and a soap for U.S. tastes. 9 Through
grey market importing, the soap designed for British tastes
ended up in the U.S. markets." The Court concluded that
11. Id. at 692.
12. See id.
13. 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
14. See id. at 361, 365-66.
15. See id. at 368.
16. See id.
17. 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
18. 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992).
19. Lever Brothers, 877 F.2d at 103.
20. See id. at 102-03.
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material physical differences in a grey market product mean
that the merchandise is prohibited by U.S. trademark law.2'
Material differences can include many different factors, which
include packaging, product configuration, product composition,
and quality control procedures.' To support its conclusions,
the Court stated:
We conclude that the existence of any difference between the
[trademark] registrant's product and the allegedly infringing
grey good that consumers would likely consider to be relevant
when purchasing a product creates a presumption of consum-
er confusion sufficient to support a Lanham Trade-Mark Act
claim. Any higher threshold would endanger a
manufacturer's investment in product goodwill and unduly
subject consumers to potential confusion by severing the tie
between a manufacturers's [sic] protected mark and its asso-
ciated bundle of traits.'
To summarize, U.S. trademark laws will prohibit grey
market imports only if the importer attempts to deceive the
consumer into believing that the importer and the trademark
holder are one and the same or if the grey market good is
materially different from the domestically sold product.
B. Copyrights
When trying to prevent grey market imports, a manufac-
turer may turn to copyright law for assistance. When a person
(or entity) possesses a copyright, the owner has the "exclusive
right to distribute copies" of that work.24 If someone were to
purchase a copyrighted work, then that party is prevented
from selling, renting, or otherwise distributing copies of that
work without the permission of the copyright holder."
To understand how a grey market import might be prohib-
ited under the U. S. copyright law, a familiarity with the Copy-
right Act is required. Within the Act is an importation provi-
sion applying to non-pirated copies,26 a provision applying to
21. See id. at 111.
22. See Societe Des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d at 642-43.
23. Id. at 641.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
25. See id. §§ 106(3), 602(a).
26. See id. § 602(a).
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distribution,27 and a provision applying to first sales.28 The
courts have had some difficulty in resolving these three provi-
sions because their purposes appear inconsistent and thus
open to a number of different interpretations.
The Copyright Act establishes that a copyright owner
possesses distribution rights for his or her copyright.29 Section
602(a) extends the copyright owner's distribution rights to bar
imports of the copyrighted work: "[i]mportation into the United
States, without the authority of the owner of [the] copyright
under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have
been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of
the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under
section 106."s° This provision gives copyright owners the abili-
ty to prohibit the importation of lawfully made copies whose
"distribution in the United States would infringe [upon] the
U.S. copyright owner's exclusive rights."3 ' As mentioned
above, section 106(3) grants the copyright holder the exclusive
right to "distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending."32 The distribution right's purpose is to give
copyright owners the power to control the first public distri-
bution of a copy.
3
If we equate the importation right to the copyright owner's
distribution right, then it stands to reason that the two rights
should be subject to the same restrictions, including the limita-
tion known as the first sale doctrine. Confusion arises, howev-
er, when one attempts to reconcile the provision of section 109,
which provides the first sale doctrine limitation on the distri-
bution right, with the importation right. Section 109(a) states:
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner
of a particular copy... lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
27. See id. § 106(3)
28. See id. § 109(a).
29. See id. § 106(3).
30. Id. § 602(a).
31. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 70 (1976); S. REP. No. 93-983, at 200-01 (1974).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
33. See MELVILLE B. NIMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §
8.11[A], at 8-141 to 8-144 (1998).
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the possession of that copy .... '" Sometimes called the ex-
haustion theory, the first sale doctrine provides that once a
copyright owner has released the work into the market, he or
she loses the right to control any subsequent distribution of
that copy.35 The doctrine states that a rightful buyer of a
copyrighted work can decide not only whether or not to distrib-
ute the copy (free of interference from the copyright holder),
but also the conditions under which that buyer can make fu-
ture sales.36
Therefore, the copyright owner who desires to prevent
parallel importing of his or her work must overcome the first
sale doctrine. If the copyright owner is allowed to bar the im-
portation of copies that have already been through more than
one seller, then that act is in conflict with the first sale doc-
trine.
The question that courts must decide is whether the first
sale doctrine trumps the exclusive distribution rights (which
includes importation rights) of the copyright holder. Producers
of grey market goods rely upon the importation right of section
602 as a means of excluding their own goods from the U.S.
market." They argue that any "unauthorized importation is a
violation of the distribution right and, therefore, an infringe-
ment."" On the other side, grey market importers seize upon
the first sale doctrine to justify their conduct.39 The theory is
that any merchandise that is purchased abroad (legitimately)
can be transferred in any way the purchaser sees fit, including
the importation of the product back into the country for re-
sale."
The Third and Ninth Circuits split over the issue of
whether the importation right is subject to the first sale doc-
trine. The Third Circuit in Sebastian International, Inc. v.
Consumer Contacts Ltd.,41 decided that once a copyright hold-
er sells a copy of the work, the copyright holder has no right to
34. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 36.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 37.
40. See id.
41. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
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control future transfers.42 Furthermore, the court based its
decision on the principle that the copyright holder receives his
or her reward for the use of that work after the copyright hold-
er makes a voluntary sale of a copy of the work.43 In addition,
the court also determined that the importation right of section
602 is not separate from the distribution right of section
106." Therefore, both importations and domestic sales fall
under the first sale doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.45 The conclusion in
this case was that section 602(a) did not fall under the first
sales doctrine.46 Therefore, the court found, the first sales doc-
trine only applies to sales made within the United States.47
Importations are exempt.4" To find otherwise, the court noted,
would render the language of section 602(a) meaningless.49
III. QuALiTY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. V. L'ANZA RESEARCH
INTERNATIONAL, IN.-A RESOLUTION
The split between circuits was resolved by the Supreme
Court in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research
International, Inc.5" L'anza Research International, Inc.
(L'anza), was a Californian manufacturer and seller of hair
care products in both the United States and international
markets.5 Within the United States, L'anza entered into
exclusive distributorships each of which had specified limits on
geography and authorized retailers." L'anza extensively ad-
vertised its products and provided special training for its re-
tailers within the United States." However, its foreign mar-
kets did not receive the same aggressive marketing strategies
42. See id. at 1094.
43. See id. at 1096-97, 1099.
44. See id. at 1097.
45. 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994).
46. See id. at 479.
47. See id. at 481.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
51. See id. at 138.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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and, as a result, L'anza's foreign prices were significantly low-
er than those within the United States.'
In 1992 and 1993, L'anza's Malta distributor sold three
multi-ton shipments of hair care products to Quality King
Distributors, Inc. (King) at foreign prices." Following the pur-
chase, King, without L'anza's permission, imported the prod-
ucts into the United States and sold the products to various
distributors at a discount.56
L'anza filed suit in federal court alleging that King violat-
ed the exclusive distribution rights under the Copyright Act.
The district court spurned King's defense based upon the first
sale doctrine and granted summary judgment to L'anza.57 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision by concluding that reading
section 109(a) (the first sale provision) to supersede section
602(a) (the exclusive importation provision) would render the
latter meaningless." It further stated that Congress enacted
section 602(a) to protect U.S. copyright holders from unautho-
rized importations.59 Grey market goods would prevent copy-
right holders from reaping the full benefit of their copies in the
United States because the copyright holder would be unable to
control his or her channels of distribution."
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the holding of
the Ninth Circuit.6 ' The Court determined that, after the first
sale of a product, whether foreign or domestic, the buyer be-
comes an "owner" within the meaning of section 109(a). "The
whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright
owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by
selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to
control its distribution."63 Therefore, the first buyer is entitled
to resell the copyrighted product according to the literal terms
of section 109(a).' Section 602(a) makes only unlawful impor-
54. See id. at 139.
55. See id.
56. See Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 139.
57. See id. at 140.
58. See L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d
1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
59. See id. at 1115-16.
60. See id. at 1116.
61. See Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 137.
62. See id. at 142.
63. Id. at 152.
64. See id. at 145.
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tation an infringement of the distribution rights guaranteed by
section 106(3).6" As a result, the Court found, the first sale
doctrine trumps the rights of the copyright holder."
As stated above, the conclusion of the Supreme Court in
this case led to grey market import permissibility. Interesting-
ly, the European Court of Justice took a different stance on
this subject.
IV. THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
The European Court of Justice addressed the issue of
parallel importing in Silhouette International Schmied GmbH
& Co. v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH.67 Silhouette was
an eyeglass manufacturer that targeted its product towards
higher income markets around the world under the trademark
"Silhouette", which was registered in Austria and elsewhere."
Hartlauer was an eyeglass distributor that sold "bargain" eye-
glasses in Austria." Silhouette would not supply Hartlauer
because it believed that distribution by Hartlauer would dam-
age its "high quality" image perceived by consumers.7"
In October of 1995, Silhouette sold some of its outdated
product to a Bulgarian company, Union Trading.71 Silhouette
instructed that the eyeglasses be sold only in Bulgaria or the
countries of the former Soviet Union and not elsewhere.72
However, Hartlauer was the ultimate purchaser of the ship-
ment and brought the eyeglasses to Austria for sale in Decem-
ber of 1995."3
Silhouette went to the Landesgericht Steyr (a regional law
court) for an interim injunction to restrain Hartlauer from
offering the eyeglasses for sale in Austria.74 Silhouette based
its demand upon the fact that it owned the Silhouette trade-
mark and that its product had not been placed into the Euro-
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Silhouette Int'l, supra note 3, at 676.
68. See id. at 681.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Silhouette Int'l, supra note 3, at 681.
74. See id. at 682.
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pean Economic Area (EEA) by it or with its- permission."s
Hartlauer argued that the trademark protection not be applied
because Silhouette had not sold the shipment or consignment
subject to any restriction on re-importing into the European
Community.76 The Landesgericht Steyr dismissed the action,
and, on appeal, the Oberlandesgericht Linz (higher regional
court) also dismissed Silhouette's action." Finally, Silhouette
appealed to the Oberster Gerichtshof (highest regional
court)."8 The Court examined the First Trade Mark Direc-
tive 9 (Directive) and the explanatory memorandum to the
legislation which transposed the Directive into Austrian law. °
The memorandum indicated that the question of international
exhaustion of trademark rights (that a trademark owner's
rights were exhausted once the trademarked product was
placed on the market anywhere in the world) was one to be left
to judicial decision.8 ' Therefore, the Oberster Gerichtshof re-
ferred this issue to the European Court of Justice for a rul-
ing.8
2
The European Court of Justice needed to address the ques-
tion of whether Austria's trademark law applied without re-
gard to the Directive. Austrian trademark law supported inter-
national exhaustion.8 ' In other words, the trademark owner
lost his or her rights after the product was put on the market
anywhere in the world. The owner could not restrict the re-
importation of the product after exhaustion took place. So, in
Silhouette's case, if the Austrian trademark law ruled then
Hartlauer could re-import the eyeglasses and sell them in
Austria.
The Directive called for exhaustion of trademark rights
only if the trademarked product was placed in the European
Community's market.' Therefore, if the law of the European
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of
the Member States Relating to Trade Marks 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1
[hereinafter Directive].
80. Explanatory Memo to the Directive. Corn (80) 635.
81. See Silhouette Int'l, supra note 3, at 682.
82. See id.
83. See generally id.
84. See Directive, supra note 79, art. 7(1); Silhouette Int'l, supra note 3, at
1999] 649
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Community held reign, then only those trademarked products
which were sold outside of the Community could be prohibited
from re-importation by the trademark holder. A trademarked
product sold into another area of the European Community
(e.g., from Austria to France) would subsequently lead to the
trademark holder's rights being exhausted. Because Silhoueite
sold its eyeglasses outside of the Community, the trademark
would not be exhausted under the Directive.
The European Court of Justice determined that the Direc-
tive limited the national trademark laws of the member states
(in this case, Austria).' Its reasoning was based upon the
Directive's preamble which provided for the harmonization of
the substantive rules which most directly affected the internal
market.8 6 The Court held that trademark exhaustion laws fell
under this categorization and therefore should be harmonized
within the Community." As a result, the European Communi-
ty would adopt a trademark exhaustion policy within the Com-
munity only.' Therefore, parallel imports would be restricted
if the importation came from outside the Community, but not
if the trademarked product came from another member state of
the Community.
V. THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE: WHO'S RIGHT?
To summarize, the United States, as a result of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Quality King, does not prohibit grey
market imports. The European Community, as a result of the
Court of Justice of the European Community's decision, prohib-
its grey market imports that come from outside the Communi-
ty. The question that needs to be addressed is: do the benefits
of allowing grey market imports outweigh the detriments?
Generally speaking, "[tihe copyright law of most countries
includes an exclusive right to distribute copies of a work to the
public." 9 Most copyright laws also provide for a first sale doc-
683.
85. See id. at 677, 688.
86. See id. at 684; Directive, supra note 79, pmbl.
87. See Silhouette Int'l, supra note 3, at 684-88.
88. See id.
89. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 322 (1998).
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trine of some sort.9" The resulting contentious issue is wheth-
er copyright and other intellectual property holders should
have the right to carve up world markets by disallowing paral-
lel or grey market imports. One must also determine if the
manufacturer's "right" to a market share (by prohibiting grey
market competition) is outweighed by the consumer's "right" to
have a more efficient economy.
Another important question is who should bear the cost of
enforcing prohibitions of grey market imports. If the state
places restrictions on them, then the manufacturer may seek
to enforce these restrictions through the state's government
(such as Customs in the United States). If this is the case
then, in essence, the taxpayer bears the cost of restricting the
grey market import. In the alternative, the manufacturer can
place restrictive clauses in the foreign distributor's contract.
These clauses would restrict the foreign distributor (or licens-
ee) to selling the product within designated geographical mar-
kets. After such restrictive clauses are in place, the manufac-
turer has a means in which to restrict re-importation. If any
grey market importation takes place, the manufacturer would
bear the cost burden by seeking enforcement of the contract's
restrictive clauses through the courts.
The benefits of allowing grey market imports are straight-
forward. Basically, price differences in the world marketplace
cause grey market importation.91 When a consumer is pre-
sented with two identical products, but one has a lower price,
he or she will choose the cheaper one. Grey market importers
argue that they provide the consumer (and sometimes retailer)
with an alternative, cheaper source of merchandise which
results in better price competition.9" In addition, grey market
importers argue that they prevent producers of affluent goods
from price discrimination.93
Allowing the grey market import, or endorsing the princi-
ple of international exhaustion, has other possible benefits.
Proponents of grey market importing argue that not only does
it benefit consumers, but it better comports with a global mar-
90. See id. at 322, n.414.
91. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 28.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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ket by preventing economic protectionism.94 As a result of
removing protectionist barriers, the standard of living is im-
proved for the country's consumers."
One can also argue that the domestic licensor has already
received a royalty for the manufacture of the good (in the form
of the licensing payment). With a prohibition on grey market
imports, the grey market importer would need the domestic
licensor's permission to re-import the identical goods. This per-
mission would most likely only be given for a price (perhaps a
percentage of profits on re-imported goods, or a one-time fee).
So, in essence, the domestic licensor receives a royalty on his
or her product twice.
Although the above mentioned reasons for allowing grey
market imports may have been considered by the Supreme
Court in making its decision, it seems that the decision was
justified more upon just an arcane exercise in statutory inter-
pretation. In fact, the Court even inserts in their opinion the
following:
The wisdom of protecting domestic copyright owners from the
unauthorized importation of validly copyrighted copies of
their works, and the fact that the Executive Branch has re-
cently entered into at least five international trade agree-
ments apparently intended to do just that, are irrelevant to a
proper interpretation of the Act.96
Because people often conform their behavior to a legal rule,
courts should consider the effects of their holdings on future
behavior, especially in areas of law that are based upon eco-
nomic incentives such as copyright law.97 It seems clear that
the Supreme Court did not consider the effects of its decision,
based upon the quoted excerpt from Quality King.
By preventing grey market imports, a country adopts what
is known as a national exhaustion policy."8 This policy quite
clearly benefits the copyright or intellectual property right
holder. The opponents of grey market imports argue that it
94. See Netanel, supra note 89, at 323.
95. See id.
96. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 153-54.
97. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 12-13 (1984).
98. See Netanel, supra note 89, at 323.
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"interferes with their contracts with exclusive licensees."99 In
some situations, allowing grey market imports also provides
the unauthorized reseller a free ride on the copyright holder's
marketing expenditures and experience.' Therefore, an au-
thorized U.S. licensee does not receive the full benefit of its
licensing fees.
Also, many authorized sellers are bound by contract to
provide quality control procedures for the product.' 0' A grey
market importer is not bound by such a contract and therefore
is not required to provide any quality control procedures. As a
result, the consumer may be deceived into thinking that such
quality controls are in place and would therefore form a nega-
tive perception of the product purchased. An example of this
would be if the consumer brings the product back for service
under a warranty. The grey market reseller has no obligation
to honor the warranty. As a result, the consumer receives no
service for the product purchased and is deprived of a per-
ceived benefit.0 2
Opponents of grey market imports argue that copyright
holders should be allowed to engage in setting different prices
for different territories to account for variable consumer de-
mand and buying power.'3 An additional argument is that if
copyright holders are unable to prevent the grey market im-
port, then not only will they no longer export the product to
other countries, but will "suffer a serious erosion of their in-
centive to create cultural works at all." °4
If the United States were to adopt a policy of national
exhaustion, copyright holders would be able to prohibit grey
market imports and "distribute expressive works in developing
countries at a considerably lower rate of return than in devel-
oped countries." 5 This could lead to greater public access to
the work(s) than if the international exhaustion policy was
99. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 28.
100. See id. A situation in which this would not occur is when the foreign
distributor (from whom the importer purchased the product) has invested a similar
amount in marketing as the copyright holder. This added marketing expense
would be passed on to the importer by raising the price of the product.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 28-29.
103. See Netanel, supra note 89, at 324.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 325.
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adopted."6 Otherwise, less developed countries would be left
out of the loop when it came to distribution of copyrighted
works because copyright holders would not want to risk their
own goods coming back into their own country. Having such
works available to the developing country is important because
"exposure to foreign works contributes to the building and
consolidating of democratic institutions and democratic cul-
tures in developing countries . ...
It stands to reason that the primary beneficiaries of pro-
hibiting grey market goods are copyright holders. The industry
that maintains the majority of copyright holders is the enter-
tainment business.0 8 The United States' largest exporting
industry also happens to be the entertainment industry.0 9
With these facts in mind, the Supreme Court, with its decision
in Quality King, has dealt a severe blow to one of the United
States' most prevalent industries. During the recent TRIPS
and WIPO Copyright Treaty negotiations, U.S. representatives
worked very diligently in order to establish a national exhaus-
tion regime within these international treaties."0 However,
these negotiations have not led to worldwide support for this
position as of yet.
The European Court of Justice, in adopting a national
exhaustion policy, has raised economic protectionist barriers
for the European Community. These barriers, as stated above,
will benefit the intellectual property right holder at the ex-
pense of the consumer."' The European Court of Justice's de-
cision goes beyond the necessary scope by excluding the grey
market import. It seems counterproductive that the few (the
manufacturers) should prosper at the expense of the many (the
consumer).
However, the Supreme Court's decision in allowing grey
market imports, while benefitting the consumer, will impose
problems for the manufacturer. The Supreme Court's ruling
fails to take into account the manufacturer who depends upon
retailer support of its product. The grey market importer can
106. See id.
107. Id. at 326.
108. See Professor James Halsey, Music Business Seminar at Oklahoma City
University (Jan. 15, 1994).
109. See id.
110. See Netanel, supra note 89, at 324-25.
111. See infra Part V.
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sidestep the quality controls put in place by the manufacturer
(customer support, warranties, etc.) and jeopardize the good-
will the manufacturer has endeavored to maintain with the
consumer. The potential result is that both the manufacturer
and the consumer suffer.
It is generally recognized that manufacturers can insert
contractual provisions limiting the distribution of its product to
certain geographical markets."' However, the foreign licens-
ee may not always conform to these provisions (and thus grey
market imports may occur). The Supreme Court's decision fails
to address the possibility that the manufacturer may not be
able to enforce these contractual provisions due to the foreign
forum's unsophisticated legal system, the inability to gain
jurisdiction in a domestic court, or other various reasons. As a
result manufacturers may be left with little effective recourse.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision should be modi-
fied to allow prohibition of grey market imports by the intellec-
tual property right holder in two specific circumstances. The
first is when the manufacturer's product is dependent upon
substantial retailer suppoi-t. This situation arises when the
manufacturer has invested in setting up significant quality
control measures to ensure customer satisfaction with the
product. In addition, these measures must be of a nature
whereas they can only be reasonably monitored or implement-
ed by the retailer. If the manufacturer can take a direct hand
in the quality control measures by eliminating the retailer as a
middleman (depending upon the product and the measure, an
example would be setting up a direct customer support help
line to the manufacturer), then any grey market import that
may occur would not fall under the prohibition because retailer
support would not be as vital.
The other circumstance would be when the manufacturer's
contractual provisions with the foreign licensee are ineffective
in preventing the grey market import from occurring. This
situation would arise when the foreign licensee ignores the
geographical market limitation provision placed in the licens-
ing agreement and the manufacturer is unable to seek redress
in any court. Although it can be argued that the manufacturer
112. See Robert W. Clarida, How to Stop Parallel Imports Despite Quality King
Ruling, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, May 1998, at 1.
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can simply cease to do business with that foreign licensee to
stop the grey market importing, it seems unreasonable that
the Supreme Court would want U.S. manufacturers to stop
exporting their goods entirely as a result of the Quality King
case. Therefore, the decision should be modified to prohibit
grey market imports when the manufacturer's contractual
provisions fail and are unable to be enforced in either a foreign
forum or a domestic one.
VI. How TO FIGHT THE GREY MARKET WITHOUT THE SUPREME
COURT'S HELP
Because the current legal regimes do little to stop parallel
imports in the United States, manufacturers have to seek
alternative methods to protect their interests. Copyright hold-
ers can stop or at least minimize the effects of the grey market
in several ways.
The most conventional way to prevent grey market im-
ports is to include geographical restrictions in distribution
contracts."' This allows the producer to control where the
product eventually goes. The problem is that the copyright
holder may have difficulty in enforcing the contract within the
United States.
Another way to fight grey market imports is to simply not
export to countries which are known to be sources of grey mar-
ket goods." 4 If this cannot be determined, then the manufac-
turer can simply cease to export entirely. Unfortunately, this
will diminish the manufacturer's profitability. Most likely, the
negative impact of the grey market goods will not outweigh the
negative impact of ceasing to sell products abroad.
Producers can also price their exported product to more
closely match their domestic prices." 5 Without a large
enough gap between the foreign price and the domestic price,
the possibility of arbitrage diminishes and the likelihood of
grey market imports also diminishes because the incentive to
resell the U.S. export is no longer there."6
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
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Another possibility is for the manufacturer to repackage
its exported product so it no longer resembles its domestic
product.17 This strategy works if the manufacturer has in-
vested substantially in advertising its product domestical-
ly.1 ' Hence, when a less expensive grey market good ap-
pears, it does not resemble the domestic product with which
the consumer is familiar. The name or look of the product is
different. This method takes advantage of the average
consumer's "aversion to the unfamiliar."" 9
CONCLUSION
The policy of international exhaustion will lead to more
benefits than detriments for the nation that adopts it. The
European Court of Justice's decision goes beyond the scope of
necessity by allowing manufacturers too much control over
their products and limiting the consumer's potential benefits
from access to grey market imports. However, a nation that
does adopt an international exhaustion policy must do so with
certain restrictions. Grey market imports must be restricted
when the manufacturer relies upon substantial retailer sup-
port. In addition, the restriction should also apply to manufac-
turers who are unable to restrict foreign licensees from distri-
bution that leads to grey market importing.
117. See id.
118. See generally Lever Brothers Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101.
119. See Clarida, supra note 112, at 1.
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